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Abstract: Human rights, including freedom of religion, are 
generally accepted and granted by all governments 
regardless of their ideology, political, economic, and social 
conditions. In a Muslim majority country such as 
Indonesia, ideally freedom of religion is considered to 
mean that the government allows religious practices of 
religious minorities or other sects besides the state religion, 
and does not persecute believers in other faiths. This paper 
discusses Indonesia’s constitutional provisions concerning 
legal rights of citizens on freedom of religion, whether the 
government upholds the constitution as a concrete way to 
deal with human rights protection or it complies with some 
groups’ demand to tighten restrictions on “the Western 
concept of” religious liberty. This paper concludes that 
even though there are many provisions in the Indonesia’s 
constitution and in its legal system which is supportive of 
religious freedom, some governmental provisions were 
enacted based on social considerations, rather than to 
strengthen constitutional provisions. 
Keywords: Religious Freedom, Human Rights, Indonesia’s 
Constitution  
Introduction 
Religious freedom can be considered as one of the most 
fundamental human rights, because this right is one of the 
manifestations of personal liberty which comes from the most inner 
part of humans. In this way, interference with the freedom of religion 
and belief will often be experienced as grave violations. Thus, everyone 
must have the freedom to observe and to practice his/her faith 
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without fear of or interference from others. The general idea of 
preserving the rights of religious freedom lies in the history of 
protecting religious minorities, and, even though the right to religious 
freedom is considered the foundation of Western human rights 
ideology, it is universally acceptable as one of the foundations of a 
democratic society. In a Muslim majority country, such as Indonesia, 
ideally freedom of religion is considered to mean that the government 
allows religious practices of religious minorities or other sects besides 
the state religion, and does not persecute believers in other faiths.  
However, in practice, religious minorities in Muslim countries 
suffer from restrictions on this right. In Indonesia for example, a new 
Indonesian decree to regulate places of religious worship which is 
arguably favor the local religious majority. It has been drawn criticism 
from groups ranging from Christians to minority Islamic sects such as 
Ahmadiyah and it has also been challenged in an appeal to the 
country’s Supreme Court.  
Moreover, on June 9, 2008, Religious Affairs Ministry, Home 
Ministry, and Attorney General signed a joint-decree ordering the 
Ahmadiyah community to “stop spreading interpretations and 
activities which deviate from the principal teachings of Islam,” 
including “the spreading of the belief that there is another prophet 
with his own teachings after Prophet Mohammed.” Violations of the 
decree are subject to up to five years of imprisonment. Human rights 
groups have jumped to the defense of Ahmadiyah, encouraging the 
group to log in a judicial review of the 1965 law with the 
Constitutional Court and the decree with the Supreme Court. In 
addition, establishment of worship places becomes more difficult for 
minority religions. Christians in Indonesia, for example, feel 
increasingly uneasy, especially after some Islamists forced several 
unofficial houses of worship to shut down. 
This paper examines the possibility of Indonesia’s constitutional 
provisions concerning religious rights of citizens to be a concrete way 
to deal with human rights protection. The paper will be divided into 
three parts. The first one describes religious freedom in the Indonesia’s 
constitution. The second part examines freedom of religion in Islam. 
This part is included because Indonesia is the biggest Muslim majority 
country in the world, which is influenced, more or less, by Islamic 
values. The third part deals with the real application of the 
  
Religious Freedom in Indonesia  
385 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
constitutional rights of religious freedom, in which some restrictions 
on religious freedom in Indonesia are applied.  
Religious Freedom in the Indonesia’s Constitution 
Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country with secular state. 
The absence of any reference to Islam in the 1945 Constitution shows 
that Indonesia is open to all religions. This is in accordance with 
international human rights norms which stipulate, among other things, 
that the government is not only prohibited from limiting religious 
freedom, it is also unacceptable, according to International standards 
of democracy, to endorse a particular religion. 
The Constitution of Indonesia provides for freedom of religion, 
and the government generally respected this right in practice, 
particularly since the amendment to the Indonesia’s constitution in 
2000. Freedom of religion is a mandate of the Indonesia’s constitution 
(the 1945 Constitution), of which article 29(2) declares that “the State 
guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace their religion and 
to worship according to their religion and conviction”. This is 
reinforced with article 28E, introduced by an amendment to the 1945 
Constitution, which states that “[e]very person shall be free to embrace 
and to practice the religion of his or her choice”, and “every person 
shall have the right to the freedom to hold beliefs, and to express his 
or her views and thoughts, in accordance with his/her conscience”.1 
The constitutional provisions were then reinforced with Indonesia’s 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
in 2006 and its subsequent incorporation into domestic law.2 
In addition to the constitutional provision above, Law No 39/1999 
on Human Rights states in article 22(1) that “every person is free to 
profess their religion and to worship in accordance with their religion 
and conviction”, and also based on article 22(2), the freedom to 
profess one’s religion and to practice one’s convictions and beliefs are 
guaranteed by the state. 
Indonesia was admitted as a member of the United Nations 
following its independence. As a member state, Indonesia is governed 
                                                                 
1 Article 28E (1) and (2). 
2 Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), 2006. “Indonesia: Ratification of Key 
Human Rights Instruments Must be Followed by Legal Reform”, a Statement by the 
Asian Human Rights Commission, retrieved from: <http://www.ahrchk.net/state-
ments/mainfile.php/2006statements/457/> 
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by the United Nations Charter. Article 55 of the UN Charter proclaims 
one of the purposes of the UN Charter as being to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion.3 Pursuant to article 56 of the UN Charter, “all members of the 
United Nations pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation 
with the United Nations for the achievement of the purposes set forth 
on article 55”.4 
The General Assembly of the United Nations considered that the 
UN Charter obliged member states to promote human rights and 
condemned those who violated such rights.5 It is important to observe 
that the UN Charter recognized the entitlement of human beings to 
rights by reason of their humanity alone. It means that the dominant 
approach to the normative foundations of international human rights 
standards regards human rights as moral entitlements that all human 
beings possess by virtue of their common humanity.6 
However, the maximum level, or common standard, of the 
protection of human rights can be seen in the text of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR lists numerous 
rights to which people everywhere are entitled, but the UDHR is not a 
legal document which has legally binding force. In fact, it is only a 
general statement of principles, which has power in the world of public 
opinion. Its principles have been translated into legal force such as 
systems of law which aim to protect human rights. These systems, laws 
and instruments have predominantly been developed and administered 
by the United Nations (UN). These include the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), along with various 
treaties that make up the international human rights regime, which 
                                                                 
3 Charter of the United Nations (1945) 
4 Ibid. 
5 UN General Assembly Resolution 719 (VII); 1953, and UN General Assembly 
Resolution 285 (111); 1949. 
6 Patrick Macklem, “What is International Human Rights Law? Three Applications of a 
Distributive Account,” Bernard and Audre Rapoport, Center for Human Rights and 
Justice University of Texas School of Law, November 19, 2007, retrieved from: <http://-
www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/humanrights/publications/macklem_texas_pa-
per.pdf>  
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have been ratified by more than 190 countries.7 According to 
international law, international treaties which have been ratified must 
be implemented by state parties in good faith by committing 
themselves to making laws in their country to protect these human 
rights. However, over half the countries of the world have not ratified 
the ICCPR or the ICESCR or other international human rights 
treaties.8 
It is normally fruitless to compare basic human rights with each 
other, to find the most important right or the most dignified right. 
However, it is worth pointing out, together with the historical facts, 
that religion and thought constitute the most inner part of human. A 
belief in a specific religion, if we look at the individuals own grounds 
for adopting and manifesting a specific belief, will often include belief 
in a divine god or other divine objects, with power over the life of each 
person. Therefore, the choice of religion is not the same as a choice 
between politics and other kinds of opinions. It is the right for anyone 
within a state, whilst reflecting its values, which are called laws and 
social norms, to choose to worship in their own way.9 Moreover, for 
many people, a religion is not only a set of belief, but also it needs to 
be translated into their actions, which of course cannot have 
repercussions for other people.10 
Historically freedom of religion was regarded as one of the first 
recognized human rights, whose general idea lies in the history of 
protecting religious minorities.11 Therefore, religious freedom is a vital 
human right and an essential component of democracy. In this 
context, one can state that the denial of religious freedoms not only 
construes an individual and personal tragedy, but also creates 
conditions of social and political unrest, sowing the seeds of violence 
                                                                 
7 Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 60. 
8 Electronic Resource Centre for Human Rights Education, retrieved from: http://www.-
hrea.org/erc/Library/First_Steps/part1_eng.html 
9 “Freedom of Religion: A Report with Special Emphasis on the Right to Choose Religion 
and Registration Systems,” Forum 18, retrieved from: http://www.forum18.org/-
PDF/freedomofreligion.pdf 
10 Brice Dickson, “The United Nations and Freedom of Religion,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 44, issue 2 (1995), p. 327. 
11 “Freedom of Religion”.  
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and conflict within and between societies and nations.12 The United 
Nations recognizes the importance of safeguarding human integrity, 
freedom and equality to ensure that there is some remedy available to 
persecuted person.13 Even though the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is considered the foundation of Western 
human rights ideology, it is one of the foundations of a democratic 
society. In a country with an official state religion, freedom of religion 
is generally considered to mean that the government allows religious 
practices of religious minorities or other sects besides the state religion, 
and does not persecute believers in other faiths.14 
Religious liberty has been recognized and enshrined in a number of 
international legal documents. For example, article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
This provision has been adopted by the ICCPR (in article 18),15 
which makes state parties are obliged to guarantee the religious liberty 
of their citizens to embrace and practice the religion or belief of their 
choice. This provision (both in the UDHR and the ICCPR) does not 
permit any limitations whatsoever. The freedoms of thought and 
conscience or to have or to adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice 
are protected unconditionally.16 
Similar provisions are also recognized by the UN Declaration on 
the elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief (the Intolerance Declaration), proclaimed 
                                                                 
12 M. Zamir, Human Rights Issues and International Law (Dhaka: University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
13 Richard Pierre and Burns H. Weston (eds), Human Rights in the World Community: Issues 
and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
14 “Freedom of Religion”. 
15 ICCPR article 18 (1): Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
16 Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publisher, 2002), p. 11. 
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in 1981. The preamble to the Intolerance Declaration reaffirms the 
principles of religious freedom and belief provided by the UN Charter, 
the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Article 6 of the Intolerance 
Declaration sets out those rights attached to religious freedom, 
including the freedom to worship or assemble and maintain 
appropriate places for these purposes and the freedom to 
communicate nationally and internationally on religious matters. 
Moreover, Article 2(2) of the Intolerance Declaration prohibits 
unintentional as well as intentional acts of discrimination and applies 
to not only public life but also to the private sphere. Article 4 and 7 of 
the Declaration requires state to take positive measures, including the 
introduction of legislation, to rectify any form of intolerance and 
discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief. 
Since its adoption, the UDHR has stood alone as an international 
standard of achievement for all people and all nations. It is universally 
known and accepted as authoritative in state which become parties to 
one or both covenants and also in those which did not ratify or accede 
to either. Therefore, there is no nation that can claim to do as it pleases 
in the manner of denial of justice and human rights on the grounds 
that its treatment of citizens is exclusively within its domestic 
jurisdiction. This outdated view is unacceptable to the current 
international community. In this context, a state which has elected not 
to ratify the covenants should be obliged to recognize the fundamental 
rights contained in the UDHR and expanded upon in the covenants. 
This view is reflected by the fact that many human right laws operate 
to oblige a state to refrain from causing harm to its own nationals or to 
other persons within its territorial jurisdiction.17 Consequently, the 
impacts of the United Nations and related treaty regimes have been so 
powerful that a general obligation to respect human rights is now a 
rule of jus cogens,18 which is a peremptory rule that cannot be derogated 
except by similar new rules developed by international law.19 
As a result, the notion of human rights plays a prominent role in 
international development cooperation, because its increased 
                                                                 
17 M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 3rd edition (London: Blackstone, 1996), p. 307. 
18 Ibid., p. 312. 
19 Natan Lerner, “Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations,” in John Witte, Jr. 
and D. van der Vyver. (eds), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspeective: Legal Perspective (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), p. 82. 
  
Bani Syarif Maula 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 02, December 2013 
390 
importance has been given to linking development and human rights. 
However, even though the concept of human rights plays an important 
role in international level, in practice international factors actually have 
little or even no effect on domestic respect for human rights. Camp 
Keith, for example, argues that there is no statistical correlation 
between ratification of the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights and increased respect for human rights.20 Similarly, 
Hathaway’s study of various international human rights treaties, 
confirms these findings. Hathaway concludes that treaty ratification is 
not only ineffective, but at times can actually produce negative results: 
“treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse, rather 
than better, human rights ratings than would otherwise be expected”.21 
Landman also comes to question the true effectiveness of international 
human rights covenants. Specifically, he finds that the effect of signing 
or ratifying these covenants on domestic respect for human rights is 
not quite strong which may impart optimism about the future 
effectiveness of international human rights covenants.22 Hathaway 
points out that the lack of effectiveness of the ratification of human 
rights treaties may be because the covenants are simply complementing 
the effect of simultaneous domestic processes of democratization, 
increasing wealth, and growing interdependence.23 
The lack of the effectiveness of some human rights treaties 
implementation is more visible in Muslim countries. This may be 
because religious liberty supposedly burdens some Muslim states with 
a competence to protect indigenous religions of the majority by the 
prohibition of apostasy and proselytizing any other religions. As a 
result, the impact of this policy may influence religious minority 
groups’ rights in practicing their religion and belief. Below it will be 
shown how Islamic rules regarding freedom of religion can be 
interpreted in some ways, particularly in a case of apostasy. 
 
                                                                 
20 Linda Camp Keith, “Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection around the 
World,” Judicature, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2002), pp. 195 - 200. 
21 Oona A. Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,” The Yale Law 
Journal, 111 (2002): pp. 1935-2042. 
22 Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 73. 
23 Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties, p. 2016. 
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Freedom of Religion in Islam 
The first part of article 18 declares without reservation that the 
rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion encompass 
freedom to change religion or belief. Based on this fact, freedom of 
religion as a basic human right has become an international question, 
particularly the practice of that right in some Islamic countries in the 
modern era. The question regarding this practice has emerged because 
the basic assumption of human rights law is that human rights are 
universal and that respect for human rights should not depend on any 
particular economic, political, or cultural context. Therefore, it is no 
doubt that the basic elements of the freedom of religion and belief 
have the status of jus cogens or an international customary law.24 Thus, a 
state obliged to respect the right regardless of ratification of 
international text. This can be seen from the fact that more and more 
communities, including some Muslim communities, are beginning to 
realize that freedom of belief is a fundamental right. However, some 
Islamic states still do not allow practice of any religion but Islam 
openly. For example, members of Egypt’s Baha’is community have 
found themselves cannot state their religion on the national identity 
cards that all Egyptians are obliged to produce to secure such things as 
driver’s licenses and social insurance.25 Meanwhile in other states, like 
Saudi Arabia, conversion from Islam to other religions is an offence 
punishable by death under apostasy law, and perhaps it is seen as a 
double crime against God and against political authority. 
Actually, such restrictions on religious freedom are not directly a 
product of shari >‘a, but rather a product of rigid interpretations of 
Islamic law in a certain time and condition. Therefore, it is not 
surprised when Islamic religious doctrine and the shari >‘a law, in their 
traditional understanding, do not uphold the concept of human rights. 
Generally, the notion of right is not at the centre of Islamic justice. 
Rather, submission to God and duty are emphasized. The apostasy law 
in pre-modern shari >‘a is understood in this sense. The death penalty 
for apostasy is usually seen by many Muslim rulers, even until today, as 
a tool for preventing Muslims from converting to another religion, or 
for forcing intellectuals, thinkers, writers and artists to remain within 
                                                                 
24 “Freedom of Religion”. 
25 The Economist; 2/16/2008, Vol. 386, Issue 8567, pp. 54-55. 
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the limitations of the established orthodoxy in a given Muslim state.26 
In this matter, it is important to look at what Islamic scripture states 
about this issue. 
In classical Islamic fiqh, apostasy is understood to mean denying 
Islam after having been a Muslim; whether an apostate embraces 
another religion or become an atheist is irrelevant in this context.27 
One of the important aspects of the debate on apostasy is its 
punishment, death, which is specified in pre-modern shari>‘a, and it is 
seen by many Muslims today as a tool for preventing Muslims from 
converting to another religion.28 This punishment remained valid until 
today in some Islamic countries, when in the same time the principles 
of freedom of religion are gaining ground in the Muslim world. 
However, in other Muslims countries it becomes in active (not in 
force) even though it is almost nowhere expressly abolished. 
Basically, there is no verse in the Qur’an stipulating a capital 
punishment for apostasy. On top of that, the Qur’an even advocates 
both freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. The foremost 
doctrine of Islam on this matter, as reflected in the Qur’an, teaches 
that there is no compulsion. 
The Qurán clearly declares la> ikra>h fi al-di >n (2:256) meaning that 
there cannot be compulsion in religion. Some commentators maintain 
that this verse is aimed at early converts and that it is later abrogated. 
But there is absolutely no basis for such an assertion. It is a declaration 
of a universally valid principle rather than any contextual statement. It 
is valid until today and will remain valid in future also. It is also 
substantiated by the fact that Islam accepted validity of other 
contemporary religions like Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrian, and etc. 
The Qurán even permitted marriages with them. They were not 
coerced into accepting Islam at all. Any coercion would lead to 
acceptance by tongue, but not endorsement by heart. Therefore, it is 
clear that the Qurán support the notion of religious freedom and 
religious faith as an individual choice. Religious freedom is presented 
in the Qurán in a variety of contexts and ways. 
                                                                 
26 Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, p. 2. 
27 Ahmed Seif al-Islam Hamad, “Legal Plurality and Legitimation of Human Rights 
Abuses: A Case Study of State Council rulings Concerning the Rights of Apostates,” in 
Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger, and Laila Al-Zwaini (eds), Legal Pluralism in the Arab 
World (Leiden: Brill, 1999), p. 221. 
28 Saeed and Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, p. 2. 
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Here in the above verse the word used is “di >n” which is usually 
translated as religion. But it has wider meaning. The word di >n not only 
includes the moral law but also pertains to its doctrinal contents and 
their practical implications, as well as to human’s attitude towards the 
object of his/her worship, thus comprising also the concept of “faith”. 
Therefore, according to the Quran human being is absolutely free to 
pursue religion of his/her choice. And this freedom does not pertain 
to only acceptance or non-acceptance of Islam; it also pertains to 
renunciation of Islam. Many Muslim jurists may reject this outright and 
maintain that though one is free to accept or not accept Islam but 
having accepted it one is not free to renounce it. Thus according to 
them freedom is limited to only acceptance or non-acceptance of Islam 
but not to its renunciation. This position does not appear to be logical. 
Freedom of conscience cannot be one-way traffic, because when it is 
seen from human rights discourse, the notion of freedom of religion 
should include the notion of freedom to its renunciation or replacing 
one’s current religion or belief with another or adopting atheistic 
views. Among the questions raised is if Islam can easily be embraced 
without any coercion, by the same token, Muslims should be allowed 
to leave it without coercion as well. This concept is actually in 
accordance to the notion of freedom of religion in the Quran, which 
states that: “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out 
clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath 
grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah 
heareth and knoweth all things”.29 
Generally, traditionalists Muslims rarely attempted to demonstrate 
that the punishment for apostasy is based on the Qur’an. In almost all 
cases, they relied on hadith texts to justify it. Therefore, the death 
punishment laid down for apostasy is mostly derived from h}adi >th texts 
signifying capital punishment for apostasy, as in Sahih Bukhari: “The 
Prophet said, if a Muslim discards his religion, kill him.”30 However, 
Muslim scholars differ about the interpretation of this text. Some made 
a distinction between apostasy which accompanied by fighting against 
Muslims, committing a capital crime or committing an act of treason 
against the Islamic state. According to this interpretation, capital 
punishment can be adopted because of these crimes, not merely 
                                                                 
29 Quran 2:256. Yusuf Ali translation. 
30 Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 52, No. 260 
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apostate (leaving Islam). While other scholars made no such 
distinction. However, the first interpretation is supported by a number 
of other sound h}adi >ths which show that when a man in Medina 
apostated from Islam, the Prophet neither ordered his execution nor 
punished him in any other way, and when the man finally left Medina, 
the Prophet never sent anyone to arrest him or punish him because of 
his apostasy.31 
Some scholars have authoritatively shown that none of the h}adi >ths 
about apostasy is without problem or weakness. Also, there is no 
h}adi >th confirming punishment or retribution solely for apostasy. In 
every single case, where punishment has been meted out, the apostasy 
(riddah) involved treason or rebellion. In fact, neither the Prophet 
Muhammad nor his companions, the models for future Islamic 
behaviour, ever forced anyone to embrace Islam. The prophet did not 
treat the apostate as an offense to be punished in his life. 
Therefore, from a brief explanation above, actually there had been 
differences amongst Muslim jurists and scholars about the definition 
and punishment of apostasy under traditional Islamic law since the 
early time of Islam. Ibn Taymiya, for example, had observed that some 
of the successors to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad such 
as Ibn al-Nakha’i (d. 718 CE) and Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 884 CE) held 
the view that a Muslim apostate must never be sentenced to death but 
should be invited back to Islam.32 Their views actually conform to the 
Qur’anic rule of propagation which says: “Invite (all) to the Way of thy 
Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in 
ways that are best and most gracious: for thy Lord knoweth best, who 
have strayed from His Path, and who receive guidance.”33 
Moreover, from the perspective of Islamic legal methodology (us}u>l 
al-fiqh), apostasy as a punishable offense has no strong evidence. The 
h}adi >th that is used to justify the death sentence for apostasy is actually 
doubtful if it is seen from some aspects. The hadith used is classified as 
‘isolated’ (ahad) instead of ‘successive’ (mutawatir). Abu Hanifa, a 
prominent Muslim jurist and a founder of Hanafi School of Islamic 
law, argues that the manifestation or the indication of isolated hadith is 
                                                                 
31 Sahih Bukhari, Volume 9, Book 89, No. 316, 318, and 323. 
32 Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 123 
33 Quran 16: 125. Yusuf Ali translation. 
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only probable (zhanni) instead of certain (qat’i). In the principle of 
Islamic legal methodology, an isolated hadith cannot abrogate the 
general meaning of a Quránic verse, because the Quránic verses are 
considered certain in their source (qat’ie al-wurud), while isolated hadiths 
are considered ‘probable’ or ‘likely’ in their source (zhanni al-wurud). 
The zhanni cannot abrogate the qat’i. 
Furthermore, no single verse of the Qurán declares that apostates 
should be punished by death. But, Qurán clearly guarantees freedom 
of religion as seen from many verses. This fact indicates that the 
justification of hadith to punish an apostate by death is weak, because 
it is in conflict with the fundamental of Islamic legal source, the Qurán 
, which supports the freedom of religion. Therefore, the meaning of 
the hadith cannot abrogate the general principle of the Qurán . 
Additionally, the Islamic history indicates that Prophet 
Muhammad had never punished the apostates whatsoever. Several 
classical literatures mention that in the days of Prophet Muhammad, 
there were at least twelve Muslims reverted from Islam, such as al-
Harith ibn Suwayd al-Ansari, who then moved away from Medina to 
Mecca, and Ubaydullah ibn Jahsh, who went to Abyssinia when he 
converted to Christian. However, during his lifetime, the Prophet did 
not command his companions to chase and punish them although they 
committed apostasy. 
That interpretation would perhaps be in consonance with the 
argument of contemporary Islamic scholars. Many of the scholars and 
jurists define apostasy law with death penalty in terms of rebellion 
against the state, where a Muslim-subject of the Islamic state after 
denouncing Islam joins with those who takes arms against the Islamic 
state and thus commits a political offence against the state.34 This law 
developed as a result of specific socio-political contexts in which 
Muslims lived at the time. Meanwhile, apostasy in the sense of an 
individual denouncing Islam without more, there is no worldly 
punishment stipulated in the Qurán , but the punishment described in 
the Qurán is only something related to punishment in the hereafter.35 
Contemporary Muslim scholars have found many indications that 
the pre-modern shari’a rule stating the apostate must be killed should 
not be taken to be the definitive interpretation, because the conception 
                                                                 
34 Baderin, International Human Rights, p. 124. 
35 Qurán, 2:217. 
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of apostasy is to be punished with death seems to have arisen from the 
fact that people who committed an apostasy and joined the enemy, 
were treated as enemies, or that, where an apostate took the life of a 
Muslim, he was put to death, not for changing his religion, but for 
committing murder. On top of that, the Quránic principles of religious 
freedom basically share common foundations with the Western 
concept of religious liberty. Belief in any religion should be voluntary 
and a private matter. 
Restrictions on Religious Freedom in Indonesia 
According to Stahnke and Blitt, there are four categories of 
countries which have majority Muslim population. The first is 
countries which declare themselves as an Islamic-State; the second 
category is countries stating Islam as the official religion of the state; 
the third is countries declaring themselves as secular-state; and the 
fourth category is countries which have not made any constitutional 
declaration concerning the Islamic or secular nature of the state, and 
have not made Islam as the official state religion.36 Therefore, 
according to this division, Indonesia is part of the last category. 
Stahnke and Blitt say that under international human rights 
standards, a state can adopt a particular relationship with a religion of 
the majority of the population including establishing a state religion. 
They also say that such a relationship does not result in violations of 
the civil and political rights of, or discrimination against, adherents of 
other religions or non-believers.37 However, many human rights 
violations happen in Muslim countries whatever their constitutional 
recognition of a state religion. Indonesia is one of the Muslim 
countries which remain restricting the rights to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion or belief, even though the country has 
constitutional provisions regarding human rights protection, as 
explained above. 
In Indonesia, the legal and constitutional guarantees of religious 
freedom have not been fully borne out in practice. Some restrictions 
continually exist on some types of religious activities. Moreover, 
                                                                 
36 Tad Stahnke and Robert C. Blitt, “The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitution of 
Predominantly Muslim Countries,” Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 36 (2005): 
pp. 947-1078. 
37 Ibid. 
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according to the report released by the U.S. State Department, security 
forces occasionally tolerated discrimination against and abuse of 
religious groups done by private actors, however the government failed 
to punish perpetrators.38 
This condition could be caused by the government’s policy and law 
which would legally permit tightened restrictions on religious liberty if 
conditions changed. Gvosdev says that some ‘democratic’ countries 
have some strategies by which governments can legally restrict 
religious freedom. The most obvious method is the insertion of 
provision of state’s interests into the constitution, “which grants to the 
government the power to proscribe groups and practices deemed to be 
in conflict with state goals”.39 In Indonesian case, Gvosdev found that 
the Indonesian government had enacted some rules “redefining 
‘religious freedom’ in a narrower or more restrictive fashion than 
general understanding”.40 Hence, the Indonesian government actually 
has been maintaining a right to define what constitutes a religion in the 
country, and has ensured through its policies that its citizens follow an 
acceptable religious faith.41 Therefore, even though the Indonesia’s 
constitution guarantees freedom of religion to its citizens,42 the 
provision should be interpreted as ‘freedom of worship’, not ‘freedom 
to practice on their beliefs’. This is because the government officially 
recognizes only six religions and restricts certain types of religious 
activities legally, particularly among unrecognized religions and sects of 
recognized religions considered “deviant”.43 For example, local 
traditional religions (animists), Ahmadis, Baha’is, and members of 
                                                                 
38 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom: Indonesia (2008), retrieved from: <http://www.state.-
gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108407.htm>  
39 Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink, Managed Pluralism and Freedom of 
Religion,” Religion, State & Society, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2001). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rodgers, “Introduction: Indonesian Religions in Society,” in 
Rita Smith Kipp and Susan Rodgers (eds), Indonesian Religions in Transition (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1987), p. 23. 
42 Article 29 (2) of the Indonesian Constitution. 
43 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom. 
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other small minority faiths found it difficult to register marriages or 
births.44 
Moreover, the government requires all adult citizens to hold a 
National Identity Card (ID card) which , identifies the holder’s 
religion. The members of religions who are not recognized by the 
government are generally unable to obtain an ID card unless they 
incorrectly identify themselves as belonging to a recognized religion. 
Some human rights groups found that some local Civil Registry 
officials rejected applications submitted by members of unrecognized 
or minority religions but issued the Identity Card that inaccurately 
reflected the applicants’ religion. Some animists received ID cards that 
listed their religion as Islam. Many Sikhs registered as Hindu on their 
ID cards and marriage certificates because the Government does not 
officially recognize their religion.45 
According to Salim, the discrimination against citizen with 
unrecognized religions actually stems from the misinterpretation of a 
Soekarno-era presidential decree No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of 
Abuse and Disrespect of Religion.46 The elucidation to this decree 
listed the six religions to which most Indonesian people adhere: Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. 
In 1967, under Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967, President 
Soeharto dropped Confucianism from the list of recognized religions 
because of its allegedly strong relationship with communism. Salim 
argues that both decrees were not meant to imply that those religions 
were the only religions that were officially acknowledged, but since 
1974 (after the enactment of Marriage Act No. 1/1974), religion has 
become a decisive factor in validating marriages, and the term ‘religion’ 
has been interpreted based on previous regulations, i.e. on the last 
decree in particular.47 Moreover, regulations on identity cards require 
their holders to indicate their religion, which result in discrimination 
                                                                 
44 The Tandem Project, United Nations, Human Rights & Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
2008, retrieved from: <http://www.tandemproject.com/issue_statements/statements/-
072408_upr_files/072408_upr.pdf> 
45 Ibid.  
46 Arskal Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratization: The Religious Majority 
and the Rights of Minorities in the Post-New Order Era,” in Ross H. McLeod and 
Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Government (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2007), p. 116. 
47 Ibid. 
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against the citizens who subscribe to religions other than any of the six 
major religions.48 Fortunately, in 2001, President Abdurrahman Wahid 
annulled that instruction, allowing Confucianism to once again become 
a recognized religion in Indonesia. However, other minority religions 
still do not enjoy the same rights and protection from the government. 
Not only related to the issuance of ID cards for people with 
unrecognized religions, the construction and expansion of houses of 
worship are also restricted. The Indonesian government continued to 
restrict the construction and expansion of houses of worship by 
issuing Joint Ministerial Regulation (No. 9/2006 of the Minister of 
Religion and No. 8/2006 of the Minister of Home Affairs) on the 
Establishment of Places of Worship,49 and it also maintained a ban on 
the use of private homes for worship unless the local community 
approved and a regional office of the home affairs ministry provided a 
license.50 Christians in Indonesia feel increasingly uneasy, especially 
after some Islamists forced several unlicensed churches to shut 
down.51 Besides sealing several churches across Indonesia, some 
Islamists have also damaged mosques and other facilities belonging to 
the Ahmadiyah group.52 
That is because the new decree stipulates that any attempt to set up 
a house of worship must take into account the religious composition 
of the district where it is expected to stand. If authorities find a request 
fits the composition, applicants need to show at least 90 people in the 
area will use the facilities and that at least 60 other residents from other 
religions approve of having it in their neighborhood.53 
Furthermore, regarding to the freedom of religious sects in 
practicing on their beliefs, the Indonesian government continued to 
restrict the religious freedom of groups associated with forms of Islam 
                                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 This decree replaced a 1969 decree that had been blamed for allowing mob action 
directed to the destruction or closure of a number of illegal places of worship. See Salim, 
“Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratization”, p. 116; and Melissa Crouch, 
“Regulating Places of Worship in Indonesia: Upholding Freedom of Religion for Religious 
Minorities?,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2007): pp. 96-116. 
50 Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratization”, p. 116. 
51 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratization’, p. 116. 
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viewed as outside the mainstream. In 2005, an Islamic religious leader 
in East Java, Mohammad Yusman Roy, was prosecuted and jailed for 
promoting the use of Indonesian language prayer. He was charged 
with “despoiling an organized religion”, a crime that carries a 
maximum punishment of 5 years in jail.54 
Moreover, on June 9, 2008, the Indonesian government, Religious 
Affairs Minister, Home Minister, and Attorney General issued a decree 
tightening restrictions on the minority Ahmadiyah community.55 The 
decree orders the Ahmadiyah to “stop spreading interpretations and 
activities which deviate from the principal teachings of Islam,” 
including “the spreading of the belief that there is another prophet 
with his own teachings after Prophet Muhammad”. Violations of the 
decree are subject to up to five years of imprisonment.56 
Conclusion 
There are many provisions in the Indonesia’s constitution and its 
legal system which is supportive of human rights. The Indonesia’s 
constitution contains no specific reference to any religions which 
means all religions and beliefs have the same status in the constitution. 
Any attempts to prohibit certain religious freedom would therefore 
infringe the constitution. However, some provisions on discretionary 
powers granted by the government have made serious implications for 
human rights. The Indonesian government has enacted some rules 
redefining religious freedom in a narrower or more restrictive fashion 
than general understanding. 
Based on the government regulations, Indonesian government has 
been maintaining a right to define what constitutes a religion in the 
country, and has been ensuring through its policies that its citizens 
follow an acceptable religious faith. Moreover, legal restrictions still 
continue on certain types of religious activities, particularly among 
unrecognized religions and “deviant” sects of recognized religions. 
The regulations were enacted just for the sake of complying with 
certain Islamists groups’ demands. In other words, the governmental 
                                                                 
54 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom. 
55 Philip Setunga, “Religious Freedom not Secure in Indonesia,” World Wide Religious News 
(WWRN): Asia/Pacific–Indonesia/Brunei, retrieved from: <http://www.wwrn.org/article-
.php?idd=28810&sec=61&con=19> 
56 Ibid. 
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regulations were ruled based on social considerations, rather than to 
strengthen constitutional tenets on freedom of religion and beliefs. [] 
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